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Chapter 8
Robustness to Malware Spreading
While many networked computing systems are vulnerable to self-propagating
malicious software, or malware, large enterprises use automated patching and hard-
ening to make their systems highly immune to malware infections. Still, persis-
tent human attackers compromise enterprise networks utilizing advanced tools,
customized malware, and zero-day exploits that anti-malware technology and patch-
ing cannot detect and mitigate [75, 76]. The three chapters in Part III study how
the diversity and fail fast principles from Chap. 4 can be exploited to achieve anti-
fragility to malware spreading in networked systems. The current chapter investigates
software diversity’s ability to make systems robust to the spreading of infectious mal-
ware and argues that diversity increases the time needed to compromise enterprise
systems, thus increasing the probability of early detection and mitigation. The two
next chapters extend the results in this chapter to achieve anti-fragility to malware
spreading.
8.1 Introduction
We view a computing system as a collection of interconnected computing devices
and consider the devices at the operating system (OS) and application levels. Com-
pilers with “diversity engines” generate the devices’ binary images, producing many
different executable images from a much smaller set of OS and application source
codes [24]. Many techniques to diversify binary images exist [77]. A transforma-
tion can be as simple as adding no-operation instructions (NOPs) to an image. The
insertion of NOPs is always possible and allows us to produce infinitely many binary
variants. Conceptually, a program’s binary images are divided into classes such that
all members of the same class share at least one exploitable vulnerability, while
members of different classes have no common exploitable vulnerabilities. Assuming
that the classes are roughly equally large, the number of classes measures the pro-
gram’s diversity with the convention that a network with only a single type, that is,
a software monoculture, has no diversity [50].
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Using well-established network models from network science [23], we combine
software diversity and computer “immunization” to halt multiple simultaneous out-
breaks of infectious malware with sparse and inhomogeneous spreading patterns,
represented by synthetic and empirical networks. We establish an explanatory epi-
demiological model of variable diversity, determine a general lower bound on the
diversity needed, evaluate the halting technique’s performance for worst-case spread-
ing over sparse and dense homogeneous networks, consider diversity’s ability to slow
down persistent threats, and discuss independent research on software diversity.
This chapter proposes and analyzes a halting technique for malware with known
static spreading mechanisms. The technique assumes that a small percentage of the
nodes can be immunized, that is, made resistant to the malware. In practice, immu-
nization, or hardening, includes the removal of non-essential software programs,
the secure configuration of remaining programs, constant patching, and the use of
firewalls and intrusion prevention systems. The author first presented the halting
technique in [56]. Chapter 10 generalizes the halting technique to malware with
unknown and time-varying spreading mechanisms.
8.2 Explanatory Epidemiological Model
Different malware strains exploit vulnerabilities in OSs and application software
to infect computing devices. An exploitable vulnerability is a mistake in the soft-
ware that enables malware to gain access to a device and its information. Examples
of exploitable vulnerabilities are buffer overflows and malformed URLs (see [24,
78, 79] for more information on vulnerabilities). Infectious malware can spread to
new vulnerable devices via network shares, removable media, Internet protocol (IP)
attacks, email messages, instant messaging, and peer-to-peer networks.
8.2.1 Epidemiological Model
We model the spreading of infectious malware over networked computing devices
by a simple graph (no self-loops or parallel edges) with N nodes of L types, 1 ≤
L ≤ N , as depicted in Fig. 8.1. There are roughly N/L nodes of each type uniformly
distributed over the graph. The node types represent different binary codes at the
OS or application level of the computing devices; that is, nodes of the same type
share an exploitable vulnerability while nodes of different types have no common
exploitable vulnerabilities. The edges represent communications between nodes. A
good measure of the model’s diversity is the number of node types L (see [50] for a
thorough discussion of diversity). Two nodes are neighbors if they share an edge. A
node’s degree k is the number of neighbors and 〈k〉 denotes the nodes’ average degree.
A network is homogeneous when all nodes have degrees k ≈ 〈k〉 and inhomogeneous
when a small fraction of nodes, called hubs, have k  〈k〉.
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Fig. 8.1 A network with N = 8 nodes, L = 4 node types of different colors, and average degree
〈k〉 = 2.5. Stars represent the infected seeds. There is S = 1 seed per node type. Only the orange
seed will infect a neighbor
The malware’s different spreading mechanisms determine the topologies of the
spreading networks. Malware utilizing random scanning to target IP addresses spread
over nearly fully connected homogeneous networks, while malware utilizing topo-
logical scanning travel over inhomogeneous networks [80]. Topological scanning
relies on information contained in infected hosts to locate new targets, including
routing tables, email addresses, and Uniform Resource Locators (URLs). The result-
ing virtual spreading networks are different from the physical networks of wired
and wireless communication links. We study multiple malware, or multimalware,
outbreaks because the deployment of several malware types is an obvious strategy to
counter software diversity. All malware types are assumed to have the same spreading
mechanism.
Our discrete-time model contains L types of infectious malware, that is, one
malware type per node type. Each malware type exploits a particular vulnerability
to infect a single node type. Initially, S nodes of each type are infected. These L · S
nodes are called seeds (see Fig. 8.1). The infection probability determines the rate at
which a sick node infects a susceptible neighbor of the same type during a time step.
To study worst-case spreading, we set the infection probability to one to ensure that
all nodes reachable from the seeds are infected. No infected node recovers.
8.2.2 Non-predictive Model
It is hard to estimate the actual spreading of malware in a networked computing
system because it is influenced by many factors, including router policies, the choice
of communication protocols, available bandwidth, traffic loads, firewall rules, anti-
malware signature sets, intrusion detection, the level of software patching, and the
misconfiguration of system parts. Rather than trying to incorporate all these fac-
tors, the epidemiological model displays very fast worst-case spreading where an
infectious node always infects all of its neighbors of the same type. While this model
cannot predict actual spreading in a network, it can explain the usefulness of software
diversity. Because actual malware is likely to spread less, it is reasonable to believe
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that the model’s malware halting translates into malware halting in real systems. This
view is supported by independent research discussed later in the chapter.
8.3 Malware-Halting Technique
The following proposed malware-halting technique immunizes hubs if they exist and
increases the diversity L to limit the fraction of infected nodes:
1. If the spreading network is inhomogeneous, immunize enough large-degree nodes
to create a homogeneous subnet when the immunized nodes and their adjacent
edges are removed.
2. Ensure that the node diversity of the homogeneous subnet is large enough to halt
multiple simultaneous malware outbreaks.
Table 8.1 outlines how to halt multimalware outbreaks on sparse (small 〈k〉) or
dense (large 〈k〉) networks with homogeneous or inhomogeneous topologies. Lim-
ited true diversity (small L) is obtained by deploying instances of different OSs
and applications with similar functionality. Michael Franz [24] argues that much
greater artificial diversity (large L) is available when users download software from
application stores utilizing compiler-generated diversity to produce many classes
of executable binary images. While true diversity is costly because the installation
of different software forces users to learn new functionality, the cost of artificial
diversity is reasonable, since the functionality is not changed.
An example illustrates the halting technique on a sparse and inhomogeneous
network with hubs. Figure 8.2a shows a synthetic network with 300 nodes. The nodes
are circles with areas proportional to their degrees, thus highlighting the hubs. The
spreading network is a software monoculture with one node type (L = 1) [28, 29].
All nodes are red to illustrate that a single seed (S = 1) infects all nodes. Figure 8.2b
shows the same network, but now with randomly distributed orange and yellow node
types (L = 2). Eight white hubs are made immune to two malware types attacking
the nodes. There is little malware spreading in this immunized “polyculture.” For a
particular selection of two seeds of different types, Fig. 8.2b shows that the malware
spreading is reduced from 300 nodes to only three red nodes; that is, the halting
technique decreases the percentage of infected nodes from 100 to 1 %.
The simple illustrative spreading network in Fig. 8.2 has no loops and the hubs
are connected in a small subnetwork. During the following analysis, we consider
networks with loops and make no assumptions about how the hubs are connected.
Table 8.1 Malware halting on spreading networks with different topologies
Malware halting on different network topologies
Sparse and homogeneous Sparse and inhomogeneous Dense and homogeneous
Utilize small true or artificial
diversity
Use hub immunization and
small true or artificial diversity
Deploy large artificial diversity
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Fig. 8.2 a Monoculture
with 300 infected nodes
whose areas are proportional
to their edge degrees. b The
same network as in (a) but
with white immunized hubs
and orange and yellow node
types. Two malware types,
each with a single randomly
selected seed, only manage
to infect one additional node
8.4 Halting Technique Analysis
The epidemiological model represents the spreading phase of multimalware out-
breaks. The following approximate analysis of this phase establishes a lower bound
on the diversity L needed by the halting technique summarized by Table 8.1.
We first clarify why hubs should be immunized in an inhomogeneous spreading
network. When the infection probability is small and the malware spreading origi-
nates from a single randomly selected seed, a strategically placed node in the “core”
of a monoculture contributes more to the spreading than a hub on the network’s
periphery does [81]. However, we study polycultures with a maximum infection
probability equal to one and multiple widespread seeds per node type. Consider a
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hub with a large degree D on the periphery of a network. Since the S seeds with the
same type as the hub are uniformly distributed over the network, one of the hub’s
neighbors could be a seed. When this seed infects the hub, the hub will again infect
roughly D/L of its neighbors of the same type. We want to prevent this peripheral
hub infection because D tends to be much larger than L and because any of the
D/L infectious nodes can cause extensive malware spreading when the infection
probability is one.
Since different malware spreading mechanisms result in distinct spreading pat-
terns, it is essential to analyze malware outbreaks on spreading networks with arbi-
trary degree distributions. Let the nodes in a network be numbered from one to N
and let node i have degree ki , i = 1, . . . , N . We consider the ensemble of ran-
dom networks with an arbitrary but fixed degree sequence {ki } generated by the
so-called configuration model (see [23, Sect. 13.2] for details). All networks have a
mean degree 〈k〉 = 1/N ∑i ki and a mean-squared degree 〈k2〉 = 1/N
∑
i k2i . Any
network has L node types, with (approximately) N/L nodes of each type.
A single-type component is a subset of nodes of the same type such that there is a
path between any pair of nodes in the set and such that it is not possible to add another
node of the same type to the set while preserving this property. The two orange nodes
in Fig. 8.1 constitute the largest single-type component. A single-type component is
a giant component when its size is proportional to N/L . If a single-type component
contains a seed, then all its nodes will be infected.
We study single-type components in a network to limit the overall fraction of
infected nodes. Let this fraction be averaged over many model runs, where each run
has L · S randomly selected seeds. The underlying network topology is the same for
all malware types, since they are assumed to have the same spreading mechanism and
the nodes of different types are uniformly distributed over the network. A particular
malware type only infects a single type of nodes. Hence, malware of different types
infects distinct subsets of nodes. Because each subset has N/L nodes, all subsets
have the same fraction of infected nodes when averaged over many model runs.
Consequently, the average fraction of infected nodes over all types can be analyzed
by considering a monoculture subgraph, defined by all the nodes of an arbitrary but
fixed type and the edges connecting these nodes. All other nodes and their adjacent
edges can be ignored.
To limit the average fraction of infected nodes, we want to choose the diversity L
such that the monoculture subgraph does not have a giant component. This subgraph
has a mean degree 〈k〉/L and a mean-squared degree 〈k2〉/L2 for large N . Because
the subgraph is contained in a random network generated by the configuration model,
the subgraph has a giant component if and only if 〈k2〉/L2 > 2〈k〉/L in the limit
for large N [23, p. 456]. To prevent the formation of a giant component, we need
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The right-hand side of inequality (8.1) is large for inhomogeneous networks
because k2i is much larger than ki for hubs. However, hub immunization reduces
the lower bound. When the nodes with the largest degrees in the original network
are immunized, we obtain a new network with N ′ < N susceptible nodes and
smaller node degrees d j , j = 1, . . . , N ′. The new network is obtained by ignoring
all immunized hubs and their adjacent edges because they no longer contribute to
malware spreading. This network “pruning” affects the previously discussed mono-
culture subgraph. The new mean-squared degree 〈d2〉 = 1/N ′ ∑ j d2j and mean
degree 〈d〉 = 1/N ′ ∑ j d j should be substituted for 〈k2〉 and 〈k〉 in inequality (8.1)
to determine the minimum needed diversity L .
Whether or not hubs in the original network are immunized to obtain a new
network, the S seeds in a monoculture subgraph can spread over at most S components
of this subgraph. These components are small in graphs without a giant component
[23], leading to a small fraction of infected nodes. Inequality (8.1) shows a trade-off
between the required number of node types L and the number of immunized hubs. If
it is possible to generate many node types, then the fraction of immunized hubs can be
reduced, making it possible to halt malware outbreaks on very large inhomogeneous
networks.
8.5 Halting Technique Performance
We have seen that the hubs in a spreading network with inhomogeneous topology
can be immunized to obtain a homogeneous network. If the hubs are not known,
then acquaintance immunization can be used to protect most hubs [25]. Acquain-
tance immunization will be discussed in Chap. 9. Here, we apply the malware-halting
technique to synthetic and empirical spreading networks with homogeneous topolo-
gies. Each network represents the worst-case spreading of S malware outbreaks per
node type. While inequality (8.1) is only strictly valid for random networks in the
limit of large N , the following NetLogo [46] simulations show that the lower bound
determines the needed diversity.
8.5.1 Sparse and Homogeneous Networks
Wireless devices, particularly smartphones, can communicate via short-range wire-
less links such as Wi-Fi and Bluetooth links. In our first epidemiological simulations,
different malware types copy themselves to new devices by opening wireless connec-
tions. Sparse and homogeneous proximity networks represent the spreading patterns.
The NetLogo model generates a proximity network with an average node degree 〈k〉
by first placing N nodes uniformly at random on a square. An edge is then added
between a randomly chosen node and its closest neighbor in Euclidean distance.
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Table 8.2 The minimum number of node types needed to halt malware outbreaks on homogeneous
proximity networks with 5,000 nodes and an increasing average node degree
Proximity networks
Average node degree 〈k〉 5 6 7 8
Minimum needed node types L 3 4 4 5
Fraction of infected nodes 3.4 % 3.6 % 4.6 % 4.8 %
Each fraction of infected nodes is averaged over 500 networks with uniform random distribution of
node types and seeds
More edges are similarly added until the network has the desired average degree 〈k〉.
Self-loops and multiple edges between nodes are not allowed. Note that although
handheld devices move over time, we only model short-term malware spreading
assuming static networks. Wireless sensor networks stay fixed for long periods.
Table 8.2 lists the lower bounds on the needed diversity L , obtained from inequality
(8.1), for proximity networks with 5,000 nodes and an increasing average degree 〈k〉.
Each fraction of infected nodes is averaged over 500 networks with the same average
degree and uniform distribution of node types, including S = 10 seeds per type. Only
connected networks were evaluated, that is, networks with isolated subgraphs were
ignored. The lower bound on the diversity L was the same for all evaluated networks
with a given average degree.
While the deterministic epidemiological model causes all nodes to become
infected in a monoculture (L = 1), less than 5 % of the nodes became infected in the
diverse proximity networks, according to Table 8.2. Previously published simulation
results and mathematical analyses of other network models confirm that small true
or artificial diversity is sufficient to halt multimalware outbreaks on homogeneous
and sparse networks [82].
We also analyze malware halting on a sparse network where the nodes represent
email addresses and the links represent e-mail exchanges between the addresses. The
network has 1,133 nodes and 5,451 edges. The largest node has degree 71 and the
average degree is 9.62. While the network is slightly inhomogeneous, we forgo the
immunization of large-degree nodes. The lower bound on the diversity is L ≥ 10.
Since the network is small, we assume only S = 1 seed per node type.
Ignoring the fact that email malware needs help from unknowing users to prop-
agate, the simulations determined the fraction of infected nodes averaged over
5,000 random configurations of node types and seeds for increasing diversity
L = 10, 11, . . . , 16. The fraction of infected nodes decreases from 8 to 4 % when
the diversity increases from 10 to 16. The additional decrease in the fraction of
infected nodes is relatively small for diversity above the lower bound in inequality
(8.1). Earlier reported simulation results for other networks [82] show similar mod-
est reductions in the fraction of infected nodes for diversities beyond the minimum
required value.
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8.5.2 Dense and Homogeneous Networks
Consider the case where L types of random scanning malware spread over a complete
network with N nodes of degree k = N −1. There are L node types and N/L nodes
per type. The types are uniformly distributed over the nodes of the network. Assume
one seed per node type. Each seed has edges to the other N/L −1 nodes of the same
type. Together, the N/L single-type nodes form a star graph with the seed in the
center. Since the seed will always infect all the peripheral nodes in the star graph, it
does not help to increase the number of node types L as long as there is one seed
per node type. All N nodes will still be infected. The only way to halt multimalware
outbreaks is to use many more nodes types than there are malware types.
If there are M malware types, then M · N/L nodes will be infected. Hence, the
diversity L needs to be proportional to N and the number of malware types M must
be much smaller than N to prevent a large infection. This observation is in accordance
with the diversity bound in inequality (8.1), which is equal to L ≥ (N − 1)/2 for
k = N − 1. More generally, consider an arbitrary path consisting of m edges in a
dense network. The path’s nodes are all of the same type with probability L−m for
m ≤ N/L . We must have diversity L ≈ N to ensure that this probability is very small
even for very short paths. As stated in Table 8.1, large artificial diversity is needed to
halt malware spreading over homogeneous dense networks with many nodes.
Since it is not completely clear how much artificial diversity is obtainable with
compilers utilizing diversification techniques [24], we cannot conclude that the halt-
ing technique is applicable to multimalware outbreaks with dense spreading patterns.
However, Todd Jackson [83] and his colleagues convincingly argue that applica-
tion stores can produce massive-scale software diversity. Furthermore, as we tran-
sition from Internet protocol version 4 (IPv4) to IPv6, topological scanning may
become more popular than random scanning due to the huge number of unused IPv6
addresses.
8.6 Persistent Targeted Attacks
The term advanced persistent threats refers to attackers employing more or less
advanced techniques to first learn about and then compromise selected computer
systems without being detected, at least not for a long time [75, 76]. Examples of
persistent threats are state-sponsored attacks on foreign commercial and governmen-
tal enterprises to steal industrial and military secrets. The attacks are often initiated
by well-timed, socially engineered spear-phishing emails delivering trojans to indi-
viduals with access to sensitive information. Malicious email is leveraged because
most enterprises allow email to enter their networks.
Persistent attackers frequently exploit OS or application vulnerabilities in the
targeted systems. An attacker first develops a payload to exploit one or more vulner-
abilities. Next, an automated tool such as a PDF or Microsoft document delivers the
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payload to a few users of a system. The payload installs a backdoor or provides remote
system access, allowing the attacker to establish a presence inside the trusted system
boundary. Finally, the attacker violates the confidentiality, integrity, or availability
of the system to achieve his or her goals.
We shall see that large software diversity increases the time persistent attackers
need to compromise systems, thus providing defenders with more time to detect the
probing of their system defenses, collect information about the attackers, and deploy
countermeasures to prevent major system breaches. As before, we divide the binary
files implementing the functionality of a particular program into L roughly equally
large classes such that all members of the same class share at least one exploitable
vulnerability, while members of different classes have no common exploitable vul-
nerability. If a user and an attacker download the same program from an application
store [24, 83], then the two downloaded files share an exploitable vulnerability with
probability 1/L . When the diversity L is large, the probability of a common vulner-
ability is small and attackers can no longer reliably analyze their own downloaded
program files to exploit vulnerabilities in users’ program files. (Note that the diversity
L must be large even if the lower bound in inequality (8.1) is small.)
Directed attacks against specific computers running known programs become
more difficult, as long as the attacker has no way of determining which specific binary
is running on what computer. Since it is necessary to create security patches tailored
to the different binary versions of the same program [24, 83], it becomes impossible
for an attacker to reverse-engineer software patches by comparing a particular patch
to the corresponding code on a user’s computer because the patch and code are both
unknown to the attacker.
8.7 Related Work
Miguel Garcia [78] and his colleagues have studied true diversity at the OS level
by considering exploitable OS vulnerabilities published over a period of roughly 15
years. The authors carefully analyzed vulnerabilities in 11 different OSs to determine
how many of these vulnerabilities occur in more than one OS. More than 50 % of the
55 studied OS pairs have at most one remotely exploitable common vulnerability.
The low numbers of shared vulnerabilities for different OS combinations strongly
indicate that true diversity is obtainable with off-the-shelf OSs. The authors also
provide a good overview of related research on software diversity.
Jin Han [79] and his colleagues have shown that true diversity is available at
the application level with off-the-shelf software. The authors analyzed over 6,000
application vulnerabilities published in 2007. About 98.6 % of the studied applica-
tions have substitutes, that is, applications that offer similar functionality, and the
majority of the applications either do not have the same vulnerability or cannot be
compromised with the same exploit code. Nearly half of the applications are offi-
cially supported to run on multiple OSs. Although the different OS distributions of
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the same application are likely to suffer from the same vulnerability, the attack code
is different in most cases.
Work by Konstantinos Kravvaritis [84] and his colleagues supports the need for
more software diversity in real networked systems. The authors reasonably assume
that binary files with the same name are realizations of a single program; that is, the
files may be different at the binary level but their functionality is identical. A client–
server application collected executable program and library files from individuals
who installed the client application on their computers. The client calculated the
MD5 hash of each collected file and sent the hash to the server. Since the hash is
unique for each different input file, the server could determine whether or not binary
files with the same name were identical.
Kravvaritis [84] and his colleagues defined three metrics to measure the diversity
of binary files with the same name. One metric, which estimates the probability of a
successful targeted attack, is given by m/n, where m is the number of instances of the
most frequent binary variant of a program and n is the total number of instances. The
server collected 1,309,834 binary instances of 205,221 files with different names.
For more than half of the files analyzed, the estimated chance of a successful attack
is in excess of 50 %. The values of all three metrics indicate that the diversity of
current software platforms is too low to significantly slow down targeted attacks.
Hence, there is a real need for the large compiler-generated diversity discussed in
this chapter.
Research by Pu Wang [85] and colleagues confirms that the number of giant
components with nodes of the same type determines the extent to which malware of
different types spread over diverse networks. The authors study the calling patterns
of 6.2 million mobile phone subscribers to determine possible spreading patterns of
malware attacking smartphone OSs. When a smartphone OS’s market share is small,
there is no giant component of the call network connecting most phones with this
OS. Although the call network is connected, a subgraph of smartphones sharing the
same OS is fragmented into many small and disjoint components [85]. The lack of
large components on which different types of malware can spread explains the low
observed saturation of malware in real mobile phone networks. Nevertheless, future
malware epidemics are possible because two OS families currently dominate the
smartphone market and more and more people buy smartphones.
Juan Caballero [86] and his colleagues have shown that the judicious use of
true diversity improves the robustness of the Internet routing infrastructure against
software vulnerabilities facilitating denial-of-service attacks, remote execution of
system-level commands without authentication, and unauthorized privileged access.
While the use of different software implementations from different code bases on
different routers increases the network’s overall robustness, it also increases the
complexity and costs of network deployment and management. Artificial diversity,
as suggested by Franz [24], is an interesting alternative to true diversity because the
complexity and costs are much reduced.
Graph coloring is the assignment of colors to the nodes in a graph subject to
a constraint [86]. Not surprisingly, a good coloring algorithm needs fewer colors
to obtain adequate true diversity on a network compared to just distributing colors
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uniformly over the network devices, as done here. Because the best coloring algo-
rithms necessitate central coordination to install the correct software on the different
devices, these algorithms are best suited to slow-changing infrastructures managed
by skilled personnel. Coloring algorithms are less useful when general users man-
age computing devices. The advantage of deploying application stores incorporating
compilers with diversity engines is that adequate diversity is achieved with very little
involvement from device owners.
8.8 Summary
While the Internet’s numerous networks are diverse due to distinct configurations,
firewall rules, anti-malware signature sets, intrusion detection, and router policies,
many networks still have limited internal diversity, making them vulnerable to seri-
ous malware spreading. The multimalware-halting technique presented can halt out-
breaks on these networks.
Advanced persistent threats represent a serious challenge to defenders of net-
worked systems with very sensitive information. Our analysis shows that software
diversity makes it harder to infect computing devices in these systems. Eventually,
large-scale experiments will be needed to determine how to best deploy software
diversity to make systems more robust to malware.
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